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2Acting and satisficing
sergio tenenbaum
I am searching for new shoes. I go to the first store, look at the selection and
prices, move to the second store, find a pair a bit cheaper and nicer than
my favorite in the first store, and buy it. My friend comes to me and says:
‘This might come as a surprise to you, but there are manymore shoe stores
in Toronto; in fact, dozens of them. The chances that you’d find an even
nicer pair for an even cheaper price in one of these stores are very high.
Fortunately, you still have time to return these shoes and continue search-
ing; I expect you will do much better.’ Sensible words indeed. But I reply:
“Thanks for your insightful remarks, but these shoes are good enough.
I shall keep them.” My response seems perfectly rational, and such
examples seem to speak for the correctness of satisficing as a standard of
rational choice. According to a general satisficing theory of rationality, an
agent is rational if (and only if ) her choices are good enough, and thus an
agent’s choice can be rational even if the agent recognizes that there is
another choice that is (or is expected to be) better.1 My expectation of
finding better shoes were I to continue my shopping adventures does not
show that my decision to buy the second-store pair was unreasonable; it is
perfectly rational for me to turn a deaf ear to my friend’s advice.
Satisficing is thus supposed to be an intuitive alternative to maximiz-
ing theories of rationality which would require me never to choose an
option if there is any other option I can choose that has a higher expected
value or utility.2 Almost no one doubts that, given normal background
Many thanks to Niko Kolodny, Erasmus Mayr, Jennifer Nagel, and an audience at the
November 2013 meeting of the DFG Netzwerk in Stuttgart for excellent comments on a draft
of this chapter. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada, and a Visiting Fellowship at Magdalen College, Oxford.
1 In some ways of understanding this definition, this would be a rather strong form of
satisficing. I will refine the view as I continue.
2 It does not matter to my purposes whether “expected value” in our understanding of maxi-
mization is a function of the agent’s preference or a function of belief or some belief-like
attitude towards objective value. I will alternate between these understandings in the chapter.
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assumptions, it is perfectly rational for me to keep my new shoes. Yet, it
is dubious whether such examples really pose a challenge to a maximiz-
ing conception of rationality. Maximizers will easily come up with ways
of representing the intuitively permissible course of action as a maximiz-
ing action. In our case, maximizers could say that the reasonableness of
stopping our search short of the expected best shoes is due to the overall
expected gain in utility rather than being due to some supposedly rational
attitude of frugality towards value as such. After all, if I were to keep
shopping for shoes I would need to forego meeting my friend for coffee,
have unpleasant interactions with other sales clerks, feel the agony of not
knowing what my full outfit will look like for a few more hours, etc.
However, advocates of satisficing do not merely rely on examples.
They often try to provide some kind of rationale that together with such
examples would show a satisficing theory of rationality to be a well-
motivated theory. Defenders of satisficing mainly rely on the limits of
human cognitive faculties, special features of human agency, or certain
types of values in generating such rationales.3 But these theoretical
defenses of satisficing face challenges of their own. In this chapter,
I present in broad outlines the problems that satisficers typically face in
defending their views. Then I present a very different kind of rationale
for satisficing – one that does not depend on any of these limits, or
peculiar features, of human agency. Rather, the defense of satisficing
I propose depends only on very general features of practical rationality.
For this very reason this view is not prone to any of the typical difficulties
encountered in various attempts to make sense of satisficing. In particu-
lar, I argue that once we move our attention to rationality in action
proper (rather than desires or preferences), especially long-term actions
with indeterminate ends, we see that satisficing has a very important role
to play in our understanding of rational agency.
A dilemma for satisficing
Most plausible versions of satisficing rules permit rather than obligate; no
one claims that you ought to forego a (known) maximizing option
3 Many proponents of satisficing argue in favor of ethical satisficing as a form of conse-
quentialism that can survive the “demandingness objection.” I am not concerned with
such views. I am only concerned with satisficing as a general decision rule. For a survey
and criticism of various possible versions of ethical satisficing, see B. Bradley, “Against
Satisficing Consequentialism,” Utilitas 18 (2) (2006), 97–108.
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because a suboptimal option clears a certain acceptable threshold.
Advocates of satisficing generally claim only that it is not irrational to
do so.4 So here are two possible satisficing rules:
General Satisficing Rule (GSR): For any choice set C, there is an option
Ot such that for every option O at least as good as Ot, if O is in C you may
choose O (even if there is another option O+ that is better than O in C)
simply because O is at least as good as Ot.5
Restricted Satisficing Rule (RSR): In some choice situations (you may)
choose option O, even if there is an option O+ available such that O+ is
better than O simply because in such a context one is allowed to choose
any option that is at least as good as Ot and O is such an option.
GSR and RSR do not cover all the possible versions of satisficing; for
instance, they eschew comparative versions in favor of absolute ones.6
However, sticking to these principles allows us to avoid various compli-
cations that are ultimately irrelevant to the argument below. It is worth
focusing on the explanatory clause to understand the difference between
the two rules. GSR claims that rationality allows for the existence of basic
“value thresholds”; that is, for the rational pursuit of certain actions in
face of better options simply because these actions are “good enough.”
RSR, on the other hand, is not committed to the view that actions can be
4 Not all versions of satisficing formulate the rule as a permission. P. Pettit, “Satisficing
Consequentialism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 58 (1984),
139–76, for instance, proposes a rule that tells us to choose, roughly, the first choice above
a certain threshold. However, in proposing a dilemma for satisficing, it is worth noting
that it arises even for weaker views. It will also be clear in what follows that in the positive
proposal I defend, the satisficing rule is indeed the only possible rational rule to follow, not
because you are required not to maximize in these contexts, but because it is not possible to
maximize in these contexts.
5 Neither O nor Ot needs to be in the set, so it is compatible with GSR that there are certain
choices that you need to maximize, since you cannot reach the “good enough” threshold.
A more precise definition would specify that Ot cannot be defined in terms of the
maximizing action in each choice set or the maximal point in the agent’s preference
ordering, so that the maximizing rule does not turn out to be an instance of satisficing
rules. An obvious way to do this would be to stipulate that Ot is never the maximal point
in the agent’s preference ordering and that replacing an option from C with another of
higher utility does not change the value of Ot. Alternatively one could change the order of
the quantifiers and stipulate that there is no unique value for Ot (other than the maximal
point) across all choice sets. But it is easier to work with the simpler formula, so I will
simply assume that one of these (or similar) stipulations hold.
6 See T. Hurka, “Two Kinds of Satisficing,” Philosophical Studies 59 (1) (1990), 107–11, for
the distinction. Nothing significant in our argument would be affected by looking into the
comparative version.
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made rational simply by being good enough; rather, RSR claims that
particular features of a choice situation justify a permission to choose an
option that is suboptimal. It is easier to see the difference between the
two principles if we think of items in a choice set ranked in terms of a
certain value. So, let us say C’s members are all aesthetic experiences
(let us say that this is a choice among contemplating various paintings).
Now suppose that GSR determines for this case that any aesthetic experi-
ence that is as good as contemplating painting P is “good enough.” Then,
according to GSR, whenever I choose to contemplate a painting that is at
least as good as P I am rational, even if I could have as easily chosen to
contemplate a better painting instead.7
RSR, on the other hand, does not imply anything nearly as general. It
will, perhaps, allow me to choose to contemplate a painting that is “good
enough,” if it would be difficult to deliberate about the various options on
this occasion, or if I am under time pressure and I tend to be a terrible
reasoner in pressure situations, etc., but it would not give me a blanket
permission to choose a less valuable option over a certain threshold.
With this distinction in mind, we can put forward a basic dilemma for
arguments for satisficing. GSR seems extremely implausible. It is hard to
get behind the idea, for instance, that, in the absence of any competing
considerations, I could choose the (equally priced, equally fattening, etc.)
WORSE QUALITY ice-cream over the PREMIUMQUALITY one simply
because WORSE QUALITY is good enough. On the other hand, if we do
specify certain features of the context, satisficing becomes more plausible.
If, as I am about to leave the store after having bought the WORSE
QUALITY ice-cream, I see that a new shipment of PREMIUMQUALITY
has arrived, it seems rationally permissible that I forego the opportunity to
take advantage of their “Easy Refund, No Questions Asked” policy.
Similarly, to use one of the classic examples in support of satisficing,
if I am trying to sell my house, it seems permissible that I settle for a
certain monetary offer on the grounds that, say, $150,000 is good
enough, even if I expect that if I were to hold out for a better offer,
I could probably get a larger amount. On the other hand, were a buyer to
write down two offers, one of $150,000 and one of $160,000, it would be
obviously irrational, ceteris paribus, to take the lower offer. The advocate
of GSR cannot explain this difference; after all, if what made the first offer
rationally permissible was simply the fact that it was good enough, it
7 I am assuming that the choices are exclusive. In most situations, you would probably have
a chance to look at both paintings.
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should also make my choice of the lower offer permissible in the second
scenario. The advocate of RSR has no problem, at least in principle,
explaining the difference. The context that makes satisficing rational was
present in the first case, but absent in the second. More specifically, in the
first case, holding out for a better offer involves prolonged anxiety,
unsettledness, etc.
However, once we made the advantages of RSR clear, we also made it
apparently easy for maximizers to accounts for the phenomena. The
maximizer can say that the agent is satisficing only from a local perspec-
tive: that she is, in our example, settling for a sale price that is merely
good enough relative to how much she could get for the house. But getting
as much money as she can for the house is only one of her goals and
reflects only one aspect of her preference ordering. She also wants peace
of mind, to avoid wasting her limited resources, etc. She is a local
satisficer, but a global maximizer. In other words, she is settling for a
good enough price since this way she maximizes her expected utility by
taking into account also her preferences for not wasting too much time in
the sale of the house, reducing anxiety, etc. The maximizer will gladly
make a concession here. It might be that adopting a strategy of satisficing
some goods is the best deliberative strategy. Given our limited resources,
calculating expected utilities is prohibitively expensive; a global maxi-
mizer should often use local satisficing as a decision procedure.8
At first, this response seems to miss the mark. After all, the intuitive
claim is that someone is permitted to choose from a large range of
options that are good enough but not required. The idea is not that an
agent must sell her house once she reaches a certain price, while knowing
that she could get a better price. She may do so, but she is not required to
do it. The intuitive thought is that it would be no less rational if she held
out and waited to get a bit more money, and this would be as rational as
if she held out for even more money, etc. Maximization would require
either an implausible indifference curve among these options or that only
one such action (or at least many fewer actions) would count as rationally
acceptable.
8 For this strategy, see D. Schmidtz, “Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy,” in Michael
Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1) (1955), 99–118; and H. A. Simon,
Administrative Behavior, 4th edn (New York: Free Press, 1997). Schmidtz and Simon
are not defending what I will be calling “proper satisficing,” so this is not a criticism of
their views in particular.
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But the maximizer can also reply to this objection. First, the need for a
heuristic itself can already justify some kind of leeway in the range of
options that will count as rationally optimal. If using a certain kind of
heuristic is optimal, and the heuristics do not distinguish between various
options that would otherwise have different utilities, then it is rational to
choose any of the options that would be recommended by these heuris-
tics. Moreover, arguably our ranking of states of affairs is incomplete or
imprecise. The fact that none of these stopping points is rationally
required might be just a reflection that our attitudes do not fully deter-
mine a precise tradeoff between, say, profit and convenience.
We can now see that there are at least three different rationales for
satisficing that are fully compatible with amore generalmaximizing theory
of rationality. First, local satisficing in relation to a certain good (trying to
get enoughmoney, bake a good enough cake, etc.) is compatible with global
maximizing when all the agent’s preferences are in. Second, a maximizing
general theory can allow that we have limited resources, and thus satisficing
might be an optimal decision procedure; that is, the decision procedure
that has the highest expected utility. Finally, satisficing might be allowed in
cases within “gaps” and “imprecisions” within our preference ordering.9
Given the high level of idealization involved in the assumptions of ortho-
dox expected utility theories, it is hardly contentious that they are not
suitable to be universal decision procedures for actual agents. Thus, it is
relatively easy to agree that, at least in some contexts, satisficing rules are
our best guides. Given human agents’ resource limitations and imperfec-
tions, an agent who adopts satisficing rules might do better, even if “doing
better” is understood as “maximizing expected utility.” We can assume
widespread agreement with the claim that it makes sense for agents in
certain circumstances at least to be guided by a rule of satisficing. However,
insofar as the correctness of a satisficing rule depends on the fact that
following such a rule maximizes expected utility, it is not, in my terms, a
“proper” satisficing rule. A “proper” satisficing rule is a rule of instrumental
rationality whose validity does not depend on its maximizing potential.
From here on, I examine the possibility of proper satisficing rules.
9 Strictly speaking, orthodox rational choice theory requires that one’s preference ordering
be complete. However, many of those who are otherwise sympathetic with maximizing
theories of rationality have expressed doubts about the validity of this requirement. See,
for instance, J. M. Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), and M. Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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When to satisfice
A difficulty for satisficing arises from the above discussion. Suppose
I identify, in a choice situation, an outcome Os that is “good enough”
and another one, Om, with greater utility or value, that is the optimal
point. Given that I know that Om is better than Os, how could it be
rational to choose Os over Om? Here it seems that saying that Os is good
enough is completely unsatisfactory. Rather than insisting that rationality
requires only that we choose an outcome that is good enough, most
advocates of satisficing try to identify features of certain choice situations
that are not given their due by the maximization procedure. So perhaps
there is a virtue of moderation that requires us not to maximize;10
perhaps our psychology is such that we evaluate things from perspectives
not fully accounted for by maximizing;11 perhaps satisficing (or at least
some version of it) might make it easier to accommodate value incom-
mensurability.12 These views have a common strategy: they accept
that, from a certain perspective, maximizing provides the correct choice
of action, but given peculiar features of human psychology or the
nature of value, the maximizing conception turns out to be a partial
one. A maximizing conception, on these views, makes certain important
considerations invisible to the rational agent. However, these approaches
have some shortcomings: they depend on substantive assumptions about
the nature of value or about our “evaluative psychology,” or they need to
defend satisficing as a second-best strategy for beings with limited cogni-
tive powers. I propose here a different view. It is part of the very nature of
the instrumental theory of rationality that a maximizing conception
cannot be a general theory of instrumental rationality, especially if we
focus on the rationality of actions rather than of decisions. We need
only very minimal assumptions about ends to show that maximizing is
an option only for a subset of actions and that a more general theory of
rationality must incorporate at least certain permissions that are incom-
patible with a general maximizing theory. I hope to show that a rational
agent could not obey the principle of instrumental reasoning in most
circumstances without being guided by a rule of satisficing.
10 M. Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supple-
mentary vol. 58 (1989), 139–63. Slote has changed his views on this matter since: see
Slote, “Two Views of Satisficing,” in Byron, Satisficing and Maximizing, 14–29.
11 M. Weber, “A New Defense of Satisficing,” in Byron, Satisficing and Maximizing, 77–105.
12 M. Byron, “Simon’s Revenge: or, Incommensurability and Satisficing,” Analysis 65 (288)
(2005), 311–15.
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Orthodox rational choice theory requires that our preference ordering
must be fully determinate so that for any lotteries L1 and L2, either L1 
L2 or L2  L1. As we said above, this is an assumption that many
philosophers find suspect. It is often agreed that a rational agent need
not have a definite preference between some outcomes, let alone between
probability distributions over outcomes. There is widespread agreement
that the agent’s attitudes such as preferences or ends might be fully
rational without being fully determinate. More importantly, orthodox
rational choice theory idealizes away an important set of ends and
projects we have: namely, indeterminate (or not fully determinate) ends
that are pursued not in a moment but through a long series of moment-
ary actions.13
All, or at least nearly all, our ends are indeterminate and need to be
pursued through actions that extend through time. Even rather simple
actions such as baking a cake cannot be completed in a single momentary
action. Given that I have no access to a miracle mixture, I must bake a
cake through a series of actions that will span intervals in which I will be
doing nothing that is instrumental to baking a cake (taking a break,
answering the doorbell, etc.).14 Moreover, our end in baking a cake will
be in various ways indeterminate or vague: what counts as an edible cake
(or a cake at all), how long it should take to bake, how large it should be,
etc., is not precisely determined.
Suppose, for instance, that Mary has the end of running a marathon.
There is a great deal that is indeterminate about her end. First, of course,
there are many opportunities to run a marathon. Doubtless, if she waits
too long to do it she will not achieve her end; however, there is a range of
time in which any marathon she completes within that time would count
as reaching her goal. She also does not necessarily set on a particular time
she thinks she needs to complete a marathon, even if there are obvious
13 I discuss these ends in S. Tenenbaum and D. Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of
the Self-Torturer,” Ethics 123 (1) (2012), 86–112, and S. Tenenbaum, “Akrasia and
Irrationality,” in T. O’Connor and C. Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of
Action (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 74–82. They are often referred to in these
papers as “vague ends” or “vague projects.” My view is that vague ends constitute a
proper subset of indeterminate ends, but nothing here depends on this. The discussion
below is a summary of the more detailed discussion in these papers.
14 On this issue, see K. Falvey, “Knowledge in Intention,” Philosophical Studies 99 (1)
(2000), 21–44. Tenenbaum, “Akrasia and Irrationality,” and S. Tenenbaum, Appearances
of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason (Cambridge University Press,
2007).
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scenarios in which she would not have achieved her goal of running
a marathon simply because it took her too long to cover 26.2 miles.
Moreover, in such cases, how to achieve the goal is also vague and
indeterminate. It is not clear how many minutes of training Mary needs
to be ready to run a marathon, and when her training will happen; she
needs a balanced diet, but she can sometimes eat cake and ice-cream; as she
is running themarathon, shemight start very fast, or somewhat fast; etc. In
fact, we might notice something important about Mary’s momentary
decisions as she is pursuing this end. Suppose she needs to decide whether
she is going to go out right now for a run. Given the indeterminacy and
vagueness of the situation, it seems that at any time she might, say, spend
one more second singing instead of going out for her run.
Of course, if she does this continuously, at some time it will be too late
to go for a run on this day, but since one missed day of running is
unlikely to make a difference to her chances of being ready to run a
marathon, these choices will not be incompatible with successfully run-
ning a marathon. Surely, if she does this every day, at the end she will no
longer be in position to run a marathon in a way that would count as
successfully fulfilling her goal. But there might be no precise point at
which this happens, or if there is, Mary might never be in a position to
know that she is at that point. And, of course, if she is past the point at
which she can still get herself ready to run a marathon, it would be
perfectly rational for her to keep on singing; after all, since she has
already failed in her end of running a marathon, there is no point in
missing out on an opportunity to sing. In such a case, the following might
obtain: given that postponing running for a second does not make a
(significant) difference to her aim of being ready to run a marathon, and
given that, say, at any moment m she prefers singing at m over running
at m, it might be that for a certain interval, at each moment it is rational
for her to sing rather than run. However, if she chooses to sing at every
moment during that interval, she will not be ready to run a marathon,
and she might prefer to be able to run a marathon than to sing on any
number of occasions, and this preference might be one that she has stably
throughout this whole interval. Assuming that there is nothing wrong
with Mary’s ends and preferences,15 if Mary always chooses to sing, her
15 One might think that we have already indicated what is wrong with Mary’s ends and
preferences: they are vague and indeterminate. However, given that nearly all our ends
are indeterminate in this way, one needs to give a compelling reason why indeterminacy
or vagueness suffices to make an end irrational.
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choices will be overall irrational without any of her momentary choices
being irrational. After all if she never trains for a marathon her choices
lead her to an outcome that she regards as clearly unacceptable, given her
original options.16
Given these facts about Mary’s ends, we can say that her ends allow for
the possibility of top-down irrationality;17 namely the possibility that the
rationality of a set of momentary actions does not supervene on the
rationality of each momentary action. But since Mary’s end does not
require that she runs at any particular moment, but if she fails to do this
at every moment she will not have pursued efficient means to her end, it
seems that what instrumental rationality demands with respect to such
ends is that she be permitted to run even if running is not her most
preferred momentary action, since the cumulative effect of always choos-
ing her most preferred action leads to the choice of a less preferred option.
I propose that actions that one performs within a range of time when one
is pursuing a long-term, indeterminate end or project need to be evaluated
from two distinct (but compatible) perspectives; a perfectly (instrumen-
tally) rational agent is never deemed irrational by either perspective.
A punctate perspective evaluates whether a momentary choice or action
is rational, given the agent’s various preferences and ends. For our pur-
poses, all that matters is that a punctate perspective will permit the agent
to choose her most preferred momentary action, but will also permit the
agent to forego her most preferred action in favor of pursuing actions that
are constitutive of the pursuit of the agent’s long-term, indeterminate
ends. Were it not for such permissions, the agent in the above example
would need to sing at every moment, and thus would not be able to run a
marathon (an option that, according to our stipulation, the agent con-
siders to be unacceptable at every moment in the relevant time interval).
The extended perspective evaluates whether enough of these permis-
sions have been exercised and thus the end has been achieved. So if our
16 One must tread carefully here, given that, if I am correct about Mary’s ends and
preferences, her preferences are not transitive. I think the right thing to say here is that
Mary is irrational if she never trains for a marathon because she ends up with a choice
that she knows to be unacceptable. For the notion of acceptability in question, see
Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects.”
17 I discuss the possibility of top-down irrationality in S. Tenenbaum, “The Vice of
Procrastination,” in Chrisoula Andreou and Mark White (eds.), The Thief of Time
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 130–50; Tenenbaum, “Akrasia and Irration-
ality”; and Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects.” The points I make in the rest of
this paragraph are discussed in more detail in these works.
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agent does not train on enough occasions, she will be unable to run the
marathon. Although at each point she will have chosen something that
from the punctate perspective she was permitted to choose, she will have
violated a requirement from the extended perspective: the requirement
to take the means to an end that she held stable through the whole
extent of the time interval in question. So although we cannot locate her
irrationality at any particular moment in time, the extended perspective
deems that she has acted irrationally by failing to take the necessary
means to one of her long-term ends. This is obviously just a very rough
sketch of how principles of instrumental reasoning apply to long-term,
indeterminate ends, but hopefully it will be enough for our purposes.
Getting some satisficing
Nothing we have said so far rules out the possibility that Mary could also
train for the marathon non-stop and never spend any time singing. The
punctate perspective allows an agent to exercise permissions not to
choose her most preferred action. But since we imposed no limits on
how often those permissions can be exercised, Mary could always choose
to go running rather than singing. Given what we know of human nature,
this is rather unlikely, but nothing we have said so far would make it
irrational for Mary to choose this alternative. But assuming that Mary
does have singing as one of her ends, always exercising such permissions
would also be a violation of instrumental rationality.
Let us look for a moment at what seems to be an intrinsic limitation
of the principle of instrumental reasoning, at least if we think of that
principle as the sole principle of instrumental rationality. Mary has two
ends: singing and running a marathon (or the instrumental end of
getting ready to run the marathon). At this level of abstraction, these
ends are fully compatible. But each of these ends has a certain internal
structure: for each of them there are better and worse realizations of the
end. As far as the end of running a marathon is concerned, a faster
marathon is better than a slower one, certain courses are better than
others, etc. If no other end were relevant to one’s life, one would train as
much as one could without risking injury, would eat only those foods
that would not interfere with one’s training, would never wear uncom-
fortable shoes, etc. One’s life purpose in this case would finish as one
crossed the finish line.
We can think of the somewhat different end of being a marathon
runner, in which this gloomy outcome would not be necessary. The end
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of a run would only signal the beginning of a new training regimen in
preparation for the next one.
Like being a marathon runner, singing has an internal structure that
never fails to give meaning to one’s life. There is no point at which singing
reaches its natural stopping point, but it is always “complete” at any point
when one stops singing. If I stop my marathon training too early, I will
have failed to achieve the end for which I was training (namely, complet-
ing a marathon). But no matter when I stop singing, I will not have failed
to realize the end of singing. And if I keep training for a marathon after
I have run it, I will just be wasting time (unless I aim to run another one);
but if I keep singing, I will keep realizing the end of singing. “Singing” is
one of the verbs that fall under the category that Vendler calls “activity
terms”: roughly, those terms that refer to activities which are complete in
themselves and do not have an end outside themselves.18
But it now seems that circumstances will abound in which the
principle of instrumental reasoning will fail to provide any determinate
guidance to an agent. After all, if the agent has conflicting ends, she will
have to violate the principle of instrumental reasoning. On this under-
standing of the end of singing, there is nothing about it that dictates that
its pursuit should ever terminate, and thus the pursuit of any end that
cannot coexist in time with singing conflicts with my unrestricted end of
singing.19 Moreover, as we know all too well, singing can be done better
or worse. Admittedly some shower soloists seem completely oblivious to
the quality of their singing, but, in general, having singing as an end, and
caring about how it sounds, go hand in hand. If you are among those
unfortunate souls who cannot run and sing at the same time, or if you
cannot do both just as well concomitantly as in isolation, you cannot,
insofar as you are rational, adopt the (unrestricted) end of singing and
the end of being a marathon runner. However, the principle of instru-
mental reasoning says nothing about how you should proceed to revise
your ends in such cases.
18 See Z. Vendler, “Verbs and Times,” Philosophical Review 66 (2) (1957), 143–60, and see
also A. P. Mourelatos, “Events, Processes, and States,” Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (3)
(1978), 415–34. My usage departs slightly from Vendler’s. One could take issue with
many of the things I say about “singing” and “training for a marathon,” but (hopefully)
these issues will not matter to the general argument.
19 One could have as an end singing just for a minute, or from time to time. My only point is
that nothing about having singing as an end mandates this structure. However, it is worth
noting that for the main purpose of the chapter such ends could also be used; we would
only need to fill in more of the story to ensure that there was potential conflict.
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Such cases of conflict explain the attraction of moving from a
traditional conception of instrumental rationality to a more modern
one.20 The traditional conception of rationality takes the instrumental
principle of rationality to be the sole principle of rationality, so it has
willing (or pursuing) ends, rather than preferences, as the fundamental
attitude to which the principles of instrumental rationality apply. In its
primary application, it is not comparative; it simply determines that
certain means must be taken (or suffice) for the achievement of a certain
end. In this primary instance the only comparative judgments that follow
from the principles of instrumental rationality are rather trivial ones;
they (nearly) all have the form “it is better to pursue necessary means
X to your end Y than not to pursue it.” If our ends do have the kind of
internal structure I have been suggesting above, they are capable of
generating some preferences, and instrumental rationality will be able
to make some non-trivial comparative judgments. Typically, when one is
building a house as an end, one aims to build an excellent house. So,
arguably, commitment to the end already commits one to prefer means
that deliver a comfortable house over means that deliver a barely liveable
one. The nature of my end in building a house and the instrumental
principle suffice to determine a certain partial ordering internal to this
pursuit. For instance, ceteris paribus, given the empirical facts about
construction, insofar as a rational agent aims to build a house, she will
prefer to use bricks over papier mâché.
It is worth distinguishing between the claim I am making here and a
similar claim made by Korsgaard.21 Korsgaard says that because a house
has constitutive standards, in adopting the end of building a house we are
also committed to building a good house. Even a shoddy builder, if he is
building a house at all, must be bound by the norms of good house
20 Of course moving to a theory that favors preference ordering as opposed to ends provides
for greater ease in accounting for risk. If what we say here is correct, this is an illusory
advantage; if rationality does not mandate anything that approximates a preference
ranking in the case in which we have certainty, it will certainly not do it once we
introduce risk. However, the view put forward here still allows that an end could
determine a preference ordering even with the sufficient precision necessary for a utility
measure. Given that we allow that an end does generate a preference ordering internal to
itself, there is no reason to think that there is in principle any limit to how precise or fine-
grained such ordering would be. Similar things apply to the case of very general means
such as money or power. Of course, one would like a more general theory of rationality
under risk, but we have to leave this task for another occasion.
21 C. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
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building.22 I agree with Korsgaard that there is a characteristic function
of building a house that determines to some extent that some houses are
better than others. Moreover, typically, when one adopts the end of
building a house, one adopts the end of building something precisely
because it has this function. In such cases, abstracting from competing
ends, adopting such an end requires that one choose the better house
over the worse house. However, nothing we say here commits us to the
view that everyone who builds a house must adopt precisely this end.
Someone might be building a historically accurate house or a highly
profitable house; the fact that a better house is insulated with polyethyl-
ene ground cover might be of no practical significance to either builder.
There is a broader question of whether any end we adopt will provide
grounds for similar comparative judgments relative to the end; again, for
our purposes, we need not commit to an answer to this question. But it is
important to note that we should not expect that such comparative
judgments would always yield anything approximating to a complete
ordering: although some houses are clearly better than the others, there
are many that are not clearly comparable with respect to the end of house
building.
At least in the case of a single end, the comparative judgments needed
are, at least in part, readily available. But in exactly these cases we do not
need to appeal to an independent preference ranking; the instrumental
principle and the ranking generated by the end will fully account for the
relevant rational requirements. However, when we come back to different
ends, it is not clear what can we avail ourselves of to determine a ranking
of options. The two ends, singing and marathon running, conflict, but
there is no end of singing-while-marathon-racing that generates an
internal ordering (or if there were, we would be looking at an altogether
different case).
Since I cannot be fully committed to singing and to running a mara-
thon such that I always choose both the best option from the point of
view of running and singing, instrumental rationality requires that I do
not pursue both singing and running a marathon in this unrestricted
manner. But we cannot appeal to the hyphenated end to determine what
would be the sufficient or best means to pursue the end of singing-while-
marathon-racing; there is nothing in the nature of either end (or both
ends considered together) that determines how the conflict should be
22 C. Korsgaard, “Acting for a Reason,” in Korsgaard (ed.), The Constitution of Agency (New
York: Oxford University Press 2008), 207–31, and Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 113.
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resolved. So, the only unambiguous recommendation in this case for a
rational agent is to revise her ends, given that the pursuit of each end in
an unrestricted manner is not a coherent possibility.
But nothing so far follows about how they should be revised: that is,
how much importance should be accorded to each end such that I know
when I should choose to sing and when I should choose to train; when
I should rest and when I should take a risk of injury and navigate through
treacherous terrain so that I can keep my appointment with my singing
coach; etc. One might say that given what has been said so far, any way in
which I revise my ends is fine as long as I no longer have conflicting ends.
I have much sympathy for this view, but if this is the correct view, we
have no reason to appeal to preference ordering. After all, once the ends
are no longer in conflict, we can go back to using the traditional concep-
tion of instrumental rationality, and let our decisions be guided by the
ends themselves. So, for instance, if I revise my ends so that I am just
training to complete one marathon and to sing a few hours per week, it
seems that I need no further rules of rationality than the instrumental
rule: pursue the means to each of these ends. As we will see in a moment,
things are a bit more complicated, but so far we have not seen why a
preference ordering would be necessary.
Another route to introducing preference ordering would be to argue
that (instrumental) practical reason cannot be neutral regarding adjudi-
cating between potentially conflicting ends. In other words, there must
be something in the nature of these two ends or the agent’s attitudes
towards them that determines their relative importance and conse-
quently a preference ordering. There are two basic arguments one can
give for such a conclusion. One can argue that there is some feature of the
attitude of having an end that will necessarily give rise to a preference
ordering. Such an argument might proceed from a general conception of
the nature of motivational states, or desires. On this view, desires are not
distinguished from each other simply by their content; they are also held
with different degrees of intensity. My desire to sing might be very
strong, while my desire to run a marathon might be very weak.
We cannot examine such views in detail, but the problems should be
quite obvious. If “strong” and “weak” are being used in a non-question-
begging way (namely, if we are not identifying “strong” with “there is a
strong instrumental reason to pursue it”), it is unclear why instrumental
rationality would recommend that preferences track strengths of desire.
One could add a principle of rationality that mandates that one pursue
one’s desires in proportion to strength, or a theory of reasons which
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implies a requirement of this form, but such principles and theories are
not part of a theory of instrumental rationality.
Let us grant that insofar as it is possible to ascribe a complete prefer-
ence ordering to an agent, then an instrumentally rational agent will
maximize utility (when utility is understood as a measure of preference).
Suppose, for instance, we can identify a preference ordering for an agent
for choices between apples, pears, and bananas. We assume that in such
a case the agent will be instrumentally rational insofar as she maximizes
utility with respect to her choices among these items. Here a maximizing
rule would determine the choices of the agent in a way that goes much
beyond any constraints that can be imposed by the principle of instru-
mental reasoning. I have been suggesting so far that nothing about the
nature of practical rationality implies that a rational agent, even an
ideally instrumentally rational agent, must have a preference ordering
that is determinate enough to imply any constraints beyond those deter-
mined by the principle of instrumental reasoning.
But one might now think that it is exceedingly easy to attribute a
preference ordering to a rational agent. In fact, we have an effective
procedure to determine the preference ordering of any agent to any
arbitrary degree of precision: namely, Ramsey’s procedure.23 The pro-
cedure asks an agent to make choices between various outcomes in
hypothetical choice situations. So a decision theorist with too much time
on her hands could ask me a large number of questions about various
tradeoffs I would be willing to make between lotteries involving various
episodes of singing and various training episodes (and other things that
I might be interested in) until she can form a complete preference
ordering. But the in-principle availability of such a Ramsey procedure
does little to establish the importance of its potential outputs for a theory
of rationality. There is no guarantee that my answers are tracking
anything significant: there is no reason to think that they are tracking
any robust behavioral dispositions, let alone anything that has any
relevance to our theory of instrumental rationality.24
One might argue that there must be something about the ends that
determines the relative importance of each end for the agent, so that in
having ends we must be committed to at least some kind of rough
preference ordering. After all, we do not take all our ends to be equal.
23 F. P. Ramsey, “Truth and Probability,” in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other
Logical Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931), 156–98.
24 See Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, for a similar point.
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We certainly think that some of them should be given very high priority
over others: my end of providing a good education for my children takes
considerable precedence over my end of growing sunflowers in my
garden. It is undeniable that certain ends are more important than others
for the agent; the question is, however, whether this fact should super-
vene simply on the attitudes the agents have in holding each end. In other
words, the proposals we are looking at claim that simply in virtue of
having each of these ends (or at least of having these ends in a certain
manner), the agent will also have preferences that express the relative
importance of each of these ends to an arbitrary degree of precision. But
this is rather implausible. The relative importance of each end should be
understood as a further attitude that the agent might or might not have:
namely, a second-order end to give priority to one end over another.25
A different line of argument in favor of the idea that a theory of
instrumental rationality should rely on preference orderings rather than
ends is more interesting and important for our purposes. If an agent’s
ends cannot be each pursued in an unrestricted manner and yet they do
not determine a preference ordering, how would a rational agent deter-
mine what to do in such situations? Even if all that an agent is required to
do is to revise her ends, she must determine how she will adjudicate
between the incompatible demands of the original ends. The peace treaty
between the warring ends must determine the borders as precisely as
possible; it should determine which of my actions will belong to singing
and which to training for the marathon. But this means that the revised
ends are just a preference ordering determining in which situations
I choose singing over training and vice versa.
I do not think that there is any determinate answer to the question of
how a merely instrumentally rational agent must proceed in cases in
which her ends conflict; in my book, instrumental rationality requires
nothing more than that the agent revise her ends so as to end the conflict.
The true substantive theory of rationality or the good might have some-
thing to say about this; perhaps singing is more important than running;
perhaps we need to live a balanced life; possibly a human being must do
whatever gives her most pleasure in such situations. But these consider-
ations are beyond the scope of a theory of instrumental rationality.
25 Of course, these attitudes could be grounded on other attitudes or judgments of the agent:
perhaps they are grounded on the agent’s evaluative belief or the agent’s identification
with some ends but not others. But this attitude is not rationally required simply by
having (or by the manner one has) the ends in question.
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However, I will not argue for these claims here. What matters for my
purposes is that we can end the conflict without relying on anything as
richly detailed as a complete preference ordering. One could also simply
adopt instead restricted ends such as “enough singing given that I am
also training for a marathon” and “enough training given that I am also a
singer.” These are vague or indeterminate ends, but, as we said above,
there is nothing intrinsically irrational about having ends with this
kind of structure. And they need not conflict; one could succeed in the
pursuit of each of them. In fact, this is the most natural (and certainly the
minimal) way of resolving the conflict: restricting each end in light of
the pursuit of the other.
This minimal revision leaves us with two vague or indeterminate ends,
and because of this structure there will be no point at which it will be the
maximum amount of singing I could have done while still being able to
train for the marathon. At each point, singing for a millisecond longer
would not affect my marathon running, or, at the very least, I would
never be in a position to know that it would. If at each millisecond, I had
the thought “one millisecond longer will make no difference” and kept on
singing, at some point I would realize that it was too late to train for a
marathon. Given the possibility of top-down irrationality discussed
above, the pursuit of our revised ends to a maximum, insofar as we can
make sense of the idea, or to pursue our most preferred option at every
moment, would be necessarily self-defeating. Thus when evaluating over
a period of time whether I was successful in my pursuit of the ends of
singing and training for a marathon, the criterion for success could not
be whether I reached the greatest amount of singing or training or a
maximum point in some function that combines both. I will be successful
in my pursuits instead if I have done – well – enough singing and
training. And since non-accidental success in the achievement of an
end should suffice for determining that an agent does not run afoul of
any principles of instrumental rationality, we can say that instrumental
rationality requires no more than that I satisfice. That is, I should pursue
singing until my singing is “good enough” and I should train until my
training is good enough; rationality is here judged in terms of whether
the agent has passed a certain vague minimal point, not in terms of
whether she has reached a maximal point.
This might look like local satisficing, rather than proper satisficing;
after all, we are not saying that the agent should choose an action that is
good enough simpliciter or that has more than a certain minimum
amount of utility, but rather that in pursuit of each separate end, she
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should ensure that she reaches, as it were, a minimum level of each.
However, it makes sense to say that a theory should recommend
only local satisficing, if local satisficing can be contrasted with global
maximizing. But there is no level in the theory in which any kind of
maximization is taken to be an ideal.26 If there is a global measurement
of assessment it is also a satisficing one, at least in a natural reading of
“satisficing.” Global success will be something like “achieve all ends to
an acceptable level” or “engage in enough singing, enough training, etc.”
In either case, global requirements will also be requirements to achieve a
certain (vague) minimum threshold.
Notice that we came to the conclusion only by looking at the structure
of the ends of a rational agent; we made no assumptions about her
computational powers, how much leisure she has to crunch numbers,
etc. In sum, a satisficing rule here is the right rule given a perfectly
rational set of ends, or a perfectly rational structure of pursuits. If we
are right that there is nothing amiss with such ends from the point of
view of instrumental rationality, we have shown that satisficing is not just
a blunt tool used by limited rational beings operating in a world full of
friction. It is, at least in some cases, also the correct rule for a perfectly
instrumentally rational agent acting in a frictionless world.
Getting more satisficing
So far we looked only at what we called above “the extended perspective.”
We saw that in order for an agent to realize ends that are potentially
conflicting and indeterminate or vague, the agent will have to use a
satisficing criterion of success. But when we look more closely at the
structure mandated by ends that introduce the possibility of top-down
26 Of course, this rules out the possibility that satisficing can be defined in terms of a
threshold of utility. H. S. Richardson, “Satisficing: Not Good Enough,” in Byron, Satisfi-
cing and Maximizing, raises this as a more general problem for satisficing. I have tried to
avoid relying on a specific satisficing rule, but I should note that, obviously, the views
presented here are not compatible with defining satisficing in terms of any kind of precise
threshold. To make it fully compatible with the views defended in Tenenbaum, “The Vice
of Procrastination,” and Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects,” we should define
the basic rule of satisficing relative to an end E something like “Choose an option that is
not an unacceptable realization of E and does not prevent the acceptable realization of
your other ends.” Further refinements are needed, but here I just want to argue for the
general plausibility of defending a satisficing rule in this manner. See Tenenbaum, “The
Vice of Procrastination,” and Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects,” for further
discussion of the notion of “acceptable” employed here.
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irrationality, it becomes clear that in the punctate perspective, something
like a satisficing standard also plays an essential role in determining what
should count as rational action. Let us take, for instance, decisions I make
in various circumstances in which I would prefer to do something on
each occasion, but for which the cumulative effect of always choosing
the most preferred (momentary) option is disastrous. Let us take, for
instance, eating. I do not (or at least let us assume I do not) have a long-
term vague end or project with respect to gastronomic pleasures. How-
ever, at various moments I enjoy eating, especially fatty or sweet foods. If
we look at my momentary decisions, I prefer, over a long period of time,
to continue eating these foods rather than stop. After all, one more bite of
food will not make a difference to my overall health and looks, and it
takes quite a bit of time for me to be so sated that I prefer to refrain from
having just one more bite of something totally delicious.
Yet this pattern of activity, as we know only too well, has disastrous
consequences.27 If I am right about the possibility of top-down irration-
ality, this is clearly a pattern of choice situations that allows for this kind
of irrationality. At every momentary choice, it might be rational to
choose to eat more, but if I always make those choices, my health will
certainly suffer in ways that are not compensated by the additional
gastronomic pleasures. A rational agent will stop maximizing at some
point, even though at this point he could do better (by taking just one
more bite). In the view I proposed above, the pursuit of the end of leading
a healthy life will generate permissions in the punctate perspective to
pursue this end even when it does not maximize utility. In fact, it seems
that an agent could exercise this permission whenever confronted with
some kind of fatty or sweet food: the agent might simply refuse anything
that is not a constitutive item of a healthy diet.
But this would be a sad aspect of one’s life, and nothing about the ends
of the agent dictates such sadness. The end of having a healthy life, for
most of us, is fully compatible with a few indulgences. However, pursuing
one’s most preferred option (or the best option) at every single moment-
ary choice is incompatible with a healthy life. The reasonable agent will
indulge here and there while making sure that his indulgences are not
unduly jeopardizing his health. But the only way to do this is to stop
indulging when one has done it enough times. In other words, a rational
agent does not exercise a permission to forego a gastronomic pleasure
27 This pattern is discussed in more detail in Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects.”
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from here on (by, say, letting the server take his plate) until he has
enjoyed enough gastronomic pleasure, or until he has failed to exercise
this permission enough times. Although it is harder to characterize this
rational constraint on more traditional satisficing terms, something like
the following satisficing rule seems correct:
In the relevant context, exercise permissions to pursue end E only to the
extent that doing so allows you to pursue often enough your momentary
preferences.
If I am right, “often enough” cannot be replaced by a precise threshold.
But if I am right, postulating precise thresholds is the wrong way to
characterize and defend the intuitive idea that, even when better options
are available, the rational agent is often satisfied with an outcome or
action that is good enough.
Conclusion
If we start with the assumption that expected utility theory is the overall
correct theory of rationality, a decided improvement over earlier theories
of instrumental rationality, satisficing seems like either a quaint request
to be contented with less than we could have, something reminiscent of
monkish ideals of self-mortification and abnegation, or at least a resigned
recognition of our limited cognitive powers. I have been urging that the
mistake is in accepting this assumption without further ado. Pursuing
what is just good enough (or some precisification of this idea) is the only
possible advice in the context of the extended pursuit of indeterminate
ends. When we think of the rationality of actions rather than of decisions
or preferences, we wonder how often anything is done that falls outside
this context. After all, actions are extended through time, and our actions
are particulars, whereas the content of our intentions is general. Perhaps
long-term indeterminate ends are not only something that is possible for
a rational agent, but are just the kind of ends that rational agents (or at
least rational agents that do not have intellectual intuitions) necessarily
have. But defending this final claim is a project for another occasion.
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